We investigated the factors influencing an academic's propensity to patent and the quality of patenting in nanotechnology and biotechnology. We found that a university researcher is more likely to be listed as an inventor of a patented innovation, regardless of the assignee, if he receives private funding, has a fairly high level of cliquishness in the scientific network and has shown a prior capacity to successfully collaborate with industry, a concept that we named innovation loops. Furthermore, citation rate and number of claims, which are used to represent patent quality, are influenced by factors similar to those explaining patent quantity.
Introduction
Worldwide, scientists have been encouraged to work within increasingly large networked teams, a phenomenon exemplified in Canada by the Networks of Centres of Excellence (NCE) initiative put in place more than 20 years ago (in 1989) . Co-publication and co-invention networks have been studied extensively in the literature to measure the social and epistemic proximities between scientists and inventors (Balconi et al., 2004; Singh, 2005) . Although academic networks, or social capital, are important to science-based entrepreneurial firms
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
In science-based high technology fields such as nanotechnology and biotechnology, the distinction between basic and applied research is a very fine one (Robinson et al., 2007) . Moreover, both fields can be considered Grilichesian breakthroughs, i.e. they are both inventions of methods of inventing (Darby & Zucker, 2003) . This characteristic makes them scientifically and economically invaluable. Finally, these are fields for which patents are an important mechanism of intellectual property (IP) protection, hence facilitating the measure of innovation.
Let us first briefly justify our use of patents, claims and citations as measures of innovation and quality. On the one hand, Rothaermel and Thursby (2007) reminded us that the patent represents an instance, in which a novel, non-trivial and useful invention comes to fruition, and Blackman (1995) showed that up to 80% of all technological knowledge is contained in them. On the other hand, firms collaborating with academics may however prefer secrecy as a means to protect the IP developed (Cohen et al., 2000) , although some academics may prefer to put their innovation in the public domain via publication in very applied journals. Patents are nevertheless used by many scholars for the study of innovation in nanotechnology (Meyer & Persson, 1998; Meyer, 2006) and biotechnology (Murray & Stern, 2007; Breschi & Catalini, 2010) .
Citations are useful in determining the capacity of the invention to enable further innovation and are used by a number of scholars (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004; Bonaccorsi & Thoma, 2007) as a reliable indicator of patent quality. Czarnitzki et al. (2011 Czarnitzki et al. ( , p. 1403 , for instance, showed that "academic involvement in patenting results in a citation premium". Claims can also be used as an indicator of patent quality (Tong & Frame, 1994) . The idea here is that the more claims associated to a patent, the broader the scope of the invention.
Sociologists have a long tradition of using social network analysis to study the behaviour of individuals (see for instance Granovetter, 1973) . More recently, Newman (2001) has shown that scientific networks form a "small world", i.e. cliquish with relatively short paths. The redundancy of the links implied by higher cliquishness ensures the development of a common language and the establishment of trust among the team, which should enhance innovation. Highly cliquish networks generally enhance system performance and knowledge diffusion (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005; Schilling & Phelps, 2007) . Transposing their argument to the realm of scientific networks implies that being surrounded by a more integrated clique should increase academic innovation performance. But only up to a point as Cowan and Jonard (2003) highlighted the negative effects of redundancy stemming from a high cliquishness and Fleming et al. (2007) found a negative impact of higher cliquishness on innovation productivity. Breschi and Catalini (2010) found that even though they present different objectives and reward structures (Dasgupta & David, 1994) , university and industry researchers are relatively well connected. In fact, they found that academic-inventors who link these two communities present a higher betweenness centrality measure in the scientific network and are essential to reducing the gap that is separating science and technology, i.e. they have a strong intermediary role in the network. Beaudry and Allaoui (2012) showed that a more central intermediary position (higher betweenness centrality) in the scientific network has a positive impact on the number of articles published by academics.
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When studying the factors that contribute to a scientist's innovative output, accounting for the position in the co-authorship network is therefore crucial if only for the great interconnexion that exists between science and technology in high tech industries. This evidence hence brings us to propose our first hypothesis:
H1:
(a) A more central network position and (b) being surrounded by a more integrated clique are beneficial to both the quantity and the quality of patents of an academicinventor.
University scientists do not solely collaborate with other university researchers, an increasing number of them also have links with industry, especially in high technology fields where the connexion between basic science and applied science is greatly significant, highlighting the importance of such partnerships (Meyer & Persson, 1998) . Collaboration between firms and academics has been extensively studied (Brusoni et al., 2001; Meyer, 2006) , generally concentrating on the benefits to firms (Bonaccorsi & Piccaluga, 1994; Murray, 2004) : lower R&D costs, building and maintaining a solid science base, higher innovation production, etc. Academics also greatly rely on this type of collaboration as the advantages are numerous: increased funding, exploration of research areas which were not originally intended, exposure to state-of-the-art application of their technology, the possibility to enhance their professional network, exposure to new ideas, etc. (Agrawal & Henderson, 2002; Siegel et al., 2003) . Czarnitzki et al. (2011 Czarnitzki et al. ( , p. 1429 further added that "academic involvement in patenting results in greater knowledge externalities as measured by forward citations". The underlying university-industry collaboration clearly benefits both the firm and the academics involved.
A number of measures can be used to assess the extent of industry -academia collaboration. One such measure of faculty consulting is firm-assigned patents on which academics are named inventors (Jensen et al., 2010; Thursby & Thursby, 2011) . In this article, we are interested in the commercially driven academic consulting (Perkmann & Walsh, 2008) , which is more likely to result in patenting. We therefore expect to validate the following hypothesis:
H2:
Academic scientists who contribute to patents of private organisations that have funded their research are more likely to patent innovations of a greater quality.
University -industry collaboration may not, however, benefit both parties equally; patenting may have a negative effect on publishing. The possible trade-off (or substitution) between the production of patentable technology and of scientific knowledge has been explained by the anti-commons hypothesis (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Murray & Stern, 2007) , the clear distinction between science and technology reward structures (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Stephan, 1996) or the fact that patenting is time consuming (Azoulay et al., 2006) . Lower publication rates can also be attributable to the fact that some academics are required to hold on to information relevant to a patent before its application to maintain the novelty of the innovation, i.e. the delay-of-publication clause (Thursby & Thursby, 2002; Breschi et al., 2007) . Some degree of complementarity between patents and papers is also conceivable (Murray, 2002; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003) because "patents can be a logical outcome of research activity" (Stephan et al., 2007, p. 74) or "most patentable research is also publishable" (Agrawal & Henderson, 2002, p. 58) . Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) suggested that scientists patent because it increases their visibility and that of the novelty of their research. Because research in nanotechnology and biotechnology often overlaps both science and technology, complementarity could overcome the substitution effect between patent and papers. We have thus chosen to focus on inputs, i.e. funding, rather than potentially competing outputs, i.e. articles.
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Funding is indeed essential to research in high-tech fields, if only for the fact that infrastructure and equipment are expensive (Robinson et al., 2007) . Two main sources of funding can be distinguished: grants, mostly provided by various public sources, and contracts, often awarded by private entities with the intent of fulfilling a specific set of applied goals generally set by the contractor. Receiving grants helps a scientist to concentrate on publishing activities. Not only will this increase the scientist's prestige or reputation within the scientific community, but also it will in turn incite the institution of affiliation to financially reward that scientist (Stephan & Levin, 1992) . Increasingly, however, researchers are patenting the results of their publicly funded research. Contracts in contrast may also lead to inventions that are most often subsequently patented. It has recently been shown that accepting contracts not only does not hinder an academic's publishing performance (Gulbrandsen & Smeby, 2005; Geuna & Nesta, 2006) , but also increases the quantity and quality of publications, which can in turn be beneficial for patenting. Our third hypothesis thus reads as follows:
(a) Grants and (b) contracts have a positive effect on patenting and on the quality of these patents.
Methodology

Data Description
This research is based on the combination of three sources of data on patents, scientific articles and a detailed account of university funding received by academics in Quebec, Canada. Patent data were extracted from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Because of the proximity to the United States and the fact that it is a much larger market, most firms that protect their IP in Canada, also do so in the United States. The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) does not provide the addresses of inventors in a consistent manner, which is essential for the disambiguation of the merged data. Data extraction used the OECD's (2005) list of biotechnology-related Industrial Patent Classification (IPC) codes and a combination of nanotechnology-related keywords taken from Barirani et al. (2013) . Although a classification highlighting nanotechnology IPC codes exists (Igami & Okazaki, 2007) , it was not used because "the lexical query of Porter et al. (2008) returns nearly 50,000 patents between 1990 and 2005, although while the USPTO currently (as of June 2012) classifies only 4193 patents in class 977 for the same period" (Barirani et al., 2013 Finally, the funding data is provided by the Systè me d'Information de la Recherche Universitaire 3 (SIRU), a system managed by the Quebec Government, which accounts for all public and private funding received by Quebec academics on a yearly basis, specifying the source and amounts obtained. The SIRU database has been "cleaned" and verified by the Observatoire des Sciences et des Technologies and hence provides an excellent base for the merger of patent and article data. We can therefore track firms and other organisations that fund academics and that are subsequently the assignees of patents, on which the funded researchers are named inventors. Merging these three databases required a considerable amount of work to overcome the traditional disambiguation of individuals. Addresses of inventors and affiliations of scientists (from both SIRU and Scopus) were checked manually to clearly identify the academic inventors, eliminate dual entries due to misspelling of names (synonymy) and add alter egos of individuals with similar names but clearly differing affiliations and addresses through time (homonymy).
Selecting only the scientists who have published at least five articles in the domains (biotechnology or nanotechnology) during the course of their career, our final sample comprises 1460 scientists from 1996 to 2005 with an average of 6 years of "presence" for a sample of 9068 observations. The reason for selecting only these scientists stems from the fact that we want to limit the number of scientists who sporadically publish or patent in these two fields for which we would not be able to distinguish the funding that relates to nanotechnology or biotechnology from that of chemistry, biology or material science, for instance. We are relatively confident that the selected individuals are active nanotechnology and biotechnology scientists.
In addition to the matching of individuals, we also had to correctly identify the assignees (from USPTO) who had contributed to research contracts (from SIRU) of Quebec 2 We deliberately cast a wider net using keywords because we want to ensure that we get the complete set of articles and patents produced by Quebec biotechnology and nanotechnology academics. The funding database to which we have access only mentions the title of the grant and contracts, it is therefore very difficult to assess which grants and contracts would be dedicated to purely biotechnology or nanotechnology research. For this reason, we believe judicious to include more articles and patents to ensure that academics on the periphery of biotechnology and nanotechnology do not bias the results because, for instance, only half of their scientific and technological production is accounted for. We have verified for a small number of scientists for whom we have the CV that this method catches most of their production. It yields better results than say using the 977 USPTO nanotechnology classification. 3 Information System on University Research.
academics. This exercise was performed manually to account for corporate restructuring, name variations (including French to English) and known horizontal mergers. Having identified the scientists who performed contracted work with an organisation before being a named inventors on a patent assigned to that particular organisation, we constructed what we referred to earlier as "innovation loops". The identification of these loops is an extensive process that also takes into account previous work by Calero et al. (2006) to reduce homonymy and synonymy of actors' names and work by Daim et al. (2007) for timeframing.
Variables
From the patents, three dependant variables were constructed for each inventor for any given year: the number of patents on which a university researcher is listed as an inventor (nbPatents), the number of claims contained in this patent (nbClaims) and the number of citations received after 5 years (nbCitations). The citations were compiled over a fixed interval of 5 years 4 to eliminate the bias that would occur with older patents receiving a disproportionate amount of citations as compared with more recent ones. These are the three dependent variables of the models described below. The basic statistics of the variables along with the correlation table are presented in Table A1 of Appendix A. Using co-publication data, we characterised the co-publishing network to calculate various network indicators of a researcher's position within the scientific community. In this paper, we focus on two of these measures to determine the network position: individual cliquishness (Cliquishness) and betweenness centrality (Betweenness), which are calculated over a 3-year 5 period to account for extended collaboration.
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Turning now to our measure of university-industry collaboration, (nbLoops) essentially represents the number of instances in which an academic is listed as an inventor on a patent owned by the firm (assignee) that originally funded the academic's research up to year t. We believe this variable to be a good indicator of successful collaboration between industry and university.
Funding data takes into account both grants and contracts. Because the amounts received may not reflect the annual spending, we calculated the average total funding over a 3-year period for contracts (Contracts) and for grants (Grants).
In addition, we have added a number of control variables to the models presented below. To account for the fact that scientists might be surrounded by a large critical mass of researchers compared with relatively isolated groups, we have added the proportion of individuals that the component to which they belong represents ( propComponent). We also control for the fragmentation of the network in the measure of the number of components necessary to account for 80% of the scientists (nbComponent). To control for the cumulative nature of applied science, we have built an ordinal variable that takes the value 0 if a researcher has never patented in the past, 1 if he has patented once and 2 if he patented more than two patents in the past (PastPatenting) related to the application year. In examining the effects of publishing on patenting, we calculated the mean 7 degree of application (BasicResearch) of the knowledge associated with the articles published by a researcher over the 3-year period leading to patent application. This degree of application is a concept that we borrow from Hamilton (2003) and is based upon an ordinal classification of the journals, in which articles are published, from applied to basic research on a scale ranging from 1 to 4. We postulate that academics that patent in more basic journals are less likely to patent. Finally, the years (d1996-d2005) and institutional affiliations (university dummy variables) are also compiled as they may help in explaining why certain researchers are more prolific inventors than others and why their patents are of better quality than others.
Estimation Methods
The data are set up longitudinally in a panel, taking into account each researcher's yearly performance from 1996 8 to 2005. All three dependent variables are non-negative discrete variables, i.e. count data. The preferred method in this case is generally the Poisson regression, however, its main structural requirement, i.e. having equidispersion, is not satisfied in any of our cases, we therefore used the negative binomial regression and its variants. Three alternative methods were used: (1) negative binomial regression with the panel option (xtnbreg), (2) negative binomial regression (nbreg) and (3) zero-inflated negative binomial regression (zinb) taking into consideration repeated observations for individuals.
It is preferable to estimate the regressions in a panel format (xtnbreg) since our database was constructed longitudinally, i.e. modelling both identity and time dimensions. The zero-inflated model proves useful when there are an excess of zeros in the dependent variable. In our case, this is due to the fact that there are several years in which academics do not patent. For instance, a researcher may have had the opportunity to patent an invention but opted not to do so or he may not have had the opportunity to patent due to the lack of an invention, resources, funding and so on. The negative binomial regression model to be estimated is therefore the following for the three dependent variables: 
7 We have explored using the median, minimum and maximum value of the degree of application. Only the mean value however yielded significant results. 8 The year 1996 is chosen as a start date as prior to 1996, Scopus and SIRU are less reliable.
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The first part of the zero-inflated regression model estimates the propensity of a researcher "not" to patent using a logit or a probit regression. This propensity is modelled as:
Cliquishness t22 ; ½Cliquishness t22 2 ; nbLoop t21 ; Basic t21 ; PastPatenting t21 ; dNano; dBio
One element of paramount importance that we have not yet discussed is the inherent problem of endogeneity when dealing with such types of data. Contracts may be easier to obtain when a researcher leads a well (publicly) funded lab. The amount of funds necessary to finance this research is influenced by the publication record of the individual scientist and of his team and vice versa (Beaudry & Allaoui, 2012) . These publications may, however, be delayed because of patenting activities, and so on and so forth. Accounting for potential endogeneity is therefore a key to mitigating potential bias in our regressions. As described here, this endogeneity is mostly because of the simultaneity of one or more dependant variables. Hence this situation is dealt by performing two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) on the negative binomial regressions 9 (Terza et al., 2008) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) on the zero-inflated negative binomial regressions (Stephan et al., 2007) . During the course of our research, we have examined three potentially endogenous variables: the number of articles, the amount of grants and the amount of contracts. Only one, the latter, proved to be endogenous and presented in this article. The first-stage regression to be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) is therefore the following, taking into account the endogenous variable relative to the contracts.
lnðContracts t21 Þ ¼ g PastLoop t22 ; lnðPastContracts t22 Þ; CodeChair ;
When instrumenting for contracts, we use other variables pertaining to funding such as the cumulative amount of contracts received in the past 10 years (PastContracts) and the average amount of contracts awarded to colleagues in the same field at the researcher's institution of affiliation (ContractsU) to consider the importance of funding at the university level. To account for personal characteristics, we add a proxy for the age of a scientist (Age) (Stephan et al., 2007) measured by the number of years since the publication of the academic's first article, which we assume to correspond to the start of an academic career, from 1985 onwards. This attribute may play a role in the sense that older academics, being less worried about "perishing" if they do not publish, are better positioned to allocate resources to more financially rewarding tasks (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Thursby & Thursby, 2005) . Finally, we added a measure of intrinsic quality of a researcher in the type of chair that the researcher occupies. The variable (CodeChair) is an ordinal indicator of the type of chair that the scientist holds, with 0 representing no chair, 1 being an industrial chair, 2 being a chair from two of the Canadian federal granting councils and 3 being a Canada research chair. For each individual, the highest rank achieved over a career is given to an academic, regardless of the year at which the individual achieved this status.
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Finally, we also calculated the cumulative number of loops to which a researcher has contributed in his career (PastLoop).
Regression Results
The results of the regressions (second stage when relevant) are presented in Table 1 . We could find no endogeneity in the (nbPatents) regressions from either three potentially endogenous variables, thus regressions 1-3 present the results for the number of patents without accounting for potential endogeneity. Regressions 4-7 show the results for the number of claims (nbClaims); as there is no ambiguity about the type of zeros, there are no patents with 0 claims, the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model is not appropriate here. Finally, regressions 8-13 present the results for the number of citations 5 years after the patent is granted (nbCitations). Table B1 of Appendix B presents the first stage of the negative binomial regressions with 2SRI as well as the logit and probit regression parts of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression using OLS regressions. The results of the first stage regressions show that Contracts are properly instrumented. Let us now go through the regression results starting with the factors influencing the propensity to patent a number of inventions for any given year. We found that there is a positive effect of contracts on patenting.
11 The same can be said for an academic's cliquishness; however, it presents a nonlinear effect indicating that having too much of an integrated network can be unfavourable for patenting. As far as industry -university collaboration is concerned, having participated in a larger number of "fruitful" collaborations (nbLoops) in the past, i.e. one that has led to an industrial patent, is found to be very beneficial. A history of patenting (PastPatenting) also has a positive effect on future patent output. These two variables are neither correlated nor do they have a moderating effect on one another when we interact them in the model (by adding an interactive term). Turning now to the quality of these patents, we found very similar results for the impact of past patenting activities within innovation loops or not (nbLoops and PastPatenting), for both the number of claims and the number of citations. Hence both a history of patenting and patenting collaboratively lead to inventions that are not only of greater scope but that also enable future inventions. As far as network effects are concerned, cliquishness, which was important for the number of patents, has a slightly less robust impact on the number of claims and citations. In general, the inverted-U relationship is maintained. Betweenness has however become a finding of interest; it seems that having a more central position in the scientific community is beneficial for both quality indicators, the effect is however not consistently significant. The Impacts of Science Networks and Industry-to-University Contracts 251 Table 1 A degree of significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. endo implies that the model tested includes the estimation of an endogenous variable (Contracts) in a first-stage regression presented in Appendix B, values in bold are identified as the regressions for which there is endogeneity. Betweenness and Cliquishness are both multiplied by
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When accounting for funding, we noticed that contracts generally contribute to better quality patents but that results on grants are mixed. When controlling for possible endogeneity of the contract variable, we found endogeneity only in two of the models examined (regressions 7 and 9). Although we found that a greater amount of grants has some effect on the number of claims, there is no observable effect on the number of citations. The inverted-U relationship between grants and claims implies that the most funded scientists produce patents of lesser "quality", i.e. too much funding hence eventually becomes detrimental to a greater patent scope.
Discussion and Conclusion
At the start of this article, we set to investigate three hypotheses regarding the impact of various factors on the patenting output of academic scientists. Although we are conscious of the limitations of our study-data on small science-based domains, biotechnology and nanotechnology, specific Canadian context, Canadian networks as opposed to world network-we are nevertheless confident to our approach, following the money through innovation loops while accounting for network positions and funding availability, brings novelty to the literature. Let us address each of these hypotheses in turn.
The first hypothesis (H1) postulated that a better network position in the co-publication network would have a positive influence on both the quantity and the quality of the patents generated. Although we found no evidence that a better intermediary position is valuable to patenting taken alone, it is important for the quality of patenting (consistently for claims and partly for citations), hence supporting the findings of Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) for firms and of Beaudry and Allaoui (2012) for scientists. More centrally located individuals in the scientific network contribute to patents of wider scope (more claims) in terms of potential uses, and which are potentially more highly cited.
The most interesting finding of this research is probably the nonlinear effect of the cliquishness (similar to the left-hand leg of an inverted-U relationship) for both quantity and quality of patenting, which we interpret as the importance, for researchers, of belonging to a fairly integrated community of collaborators. Too little cliquishness is not beneficial but too much cliquishness eventually has a decreasing returns effect. In other words, academic inventors increase the likelihood of patenting innovations of greater quality by being surrounded by a more integrated clique (supporting the findings of Uzzi & Spiro, 2005 as well as that of Schilling & Phelps, 2007) , but eventually the increased benefits of integration start to diminish, hence suggesting a negative effect associated with too much redundancy as highlighted by Cowan and Jonard (2003) . We do not observe a truly negative effect of higher cliquishness, as do Fleming et al. (2007) .
12 This highlights the importance of the diversity of links with distinct epistemic communities. Academic inventors would therefore be better off investing their efforts in a slightly less integrated, or more diversified, scientific clique, if a great deal of effort is required to do so. For instance, the type of efforts required could be related to setting up a very large research network, or investing a great deal of time in building an international network. H1 is therefore only partially supported.
Somewhat related, the second hypothesis (H2) aimed at identifying the influence of university-industry collaboration, which we modelled as being part of an innovation loop, on patenting productivity and quality. We found that participation to innovation loops currently and in the past, i.e. the number of instances for which a researcher contracted by a particular firm is a named inventor on a patent of this particular firm, has a strong positive influence on the propensity to patent more and to generate patents of higher quality, in terms of claims and of citations, hence validating H2. A closer implication of academics into private innovation does have a positive impact not only on the propensity to patent of academics but also on the quality of these innovations, a result somewhat akin with Czarnitzki et al.'s (2011) findings that patents involving academics are more cited.
The third hypothesis (H3) proposed that both grants and contracts have a positive effect on the propensity to patent and on the quality of these patents. Not surprisingly, we found a positive and significant relationship between contracts and patents. Grants have been shown to have little to no effect on patenting and citations. Contracts do, however, have an impact on the number of claims. The relationship between public funding and the number of claims follows an inverted-U relationship, in other words, the relationship is positive up to a certain threshold beyond which a larger amount of funding becomes detrimental to more numerous claims, hence suggesting a substitution effect between grants and contracts. Academics less successful at obtaining public funds may compensate this lack of funding by raising funds from private contracts. It is also possible that researchers well provided in contracts feel a lesser need to compete for public funds. Although our research cannot disentangle these two effects 13 for the left-hand leg of the inverted-U shaped curve, the negative effect (although not always significant) of grants on the number of claims associated with greater amounts of public funds suggests a more important focus on basic research. Consequently, hypothesis H3a is refuted but H3b is generally validated. Canada has no Bayh -Dole Act equivalent and all universities have different IP protection policies, which could explain why public funding has no consistent effect on patents and their quality and contracts dominate the patenting scene. Because Canadian granting councils strongly encourage university-industry partnerships in a number of funding programmes, an important mechanism to ensure that university generated innovations end up in industry, their effect on innovation may therefore be indirect, and hence not picked up by our analysis.
To sum up, what does our research tell us about the collaborative communities of academic-inventors? First, researchers should collaborate with a number of research communities that are not perfectly interrelated, hence maintaining some level of diversity, as it may eventually lead to decreasing returns in terms of quantity and quality of patents. Second, our results thus support the commercially driven academic consulting argument of Perkmann and Walsh (2008) , exemplified by private contracts and by what we have coined "innovation loops". In other words, scientists closely involved in research that lead to patents owned, and possibly instigated, by their private partners produce more and better patents than other academic-inventors. 13 We have examined various models to try to account for these two effects, including interactive variables between grants and contracts, but none yielded significant results. 254 C. Beaudry & R. Kananian Table A1 . Appendix A Table B1 . The Impacts of Science Networks and Industry-to-University Contracts 259 A degree of significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. endo implies that the model tested includes the estimation of an endogenous variable (Contracts) in a first stage regression presented in Appendix B, values in bold are identified as the regressions for which there is endogeneity. Betweenness and Cliquishness are both multiplied by 10
